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This thesis examines the previous acquisition strategy of a typical aircraft 
survivability equipment (ASE) procurement through an economic analysis. It also 
explores new philosophies to traditional acquisition methods and combines the 
economic lessons learned to suggest improvements to the current ASE procurement 
strategy. 
The AN/APR-39A(V)1 Radar System Detecting Set (RSDS) was analyzed 
because it represented, on average, the common approach to acquiring ASE in prior 
years. After analyzing this system's cost data by using the Learning Rate (LR) 
Theory, and comparing it to the Should Cost Analysis Team's (SCAT) cost 
estimation, it appeared that actual costs did not follow the agreed upon 90% LR. 
A closer examination concluded that a 90% LR was used, but price discrepancies 
to the LR estimations were caused by an innovative payment scheme. 
New approaches to systems acquisition, along with the appropriate use of the 
LR and payment methods can enhance the acquisition process. This thesis 
recommends selected new procurement philosophies for an improved ASE strategy. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The time is right for change. The world, as we knew it 
as little as six years ago, has undergone tremendous change. 
We are now experiencing an era that has brought the demise of 
the status quo. Corporations, systems, manufacturers, and 
even professional sports, are exerting unprecedented efforts 
toward continuous improvement to survive in this period of 
revolutionary change. Businesses or activities that refuse 
improvement or implement it too slowly, suffer, if not die. 
Government is also changing. The President and Vice 
President have challenged all in Government to "reinvent" it. 
As a result, we now have "Re-invention Labs." Another 
catalyst for change is the Vice-President's "National 
Performance Review." This review proposes to bring common 
sense and sound business practices into Government operations. 
It also will replace or modify existing rules and regulations 
that have little or no value. The result will be to 
streamline Government processes. This is great news for the 
military acquisition communities. For several years there 
have been many studies on "acquisition reform," the 800 Panel 
being the most noteworthy. Although this study identified 
many areas for improvement, it did little to actually lessen 
the burdens of the cumbersome acquisition process. The 
Clinton Administration, however, is providing the direction 
and smoothing the path that will lessen the load on the 
acquisition community. This is the time to be visionary and 
expend every effort to reassess and reform current acquisition 
strategies to capitalize on the loosened regulations and 
innovative ideas for using the latest technologies and 
philosophies to develop an improved acquisition strategy that 
will extend into the 21st Century. 
The focus of this thesis is to learn, through an economic 
analysis of a previous aircraft survivability equipment (ASE) 
system, how to exploit the opportunities presented in 
acquisition reform, the changes mentioned above, and emerging 
Research Development Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) philosophies. 
Any improvement over the current method of procuring ASE for 
the United States Army Aviation Fleet of aircraft is 
certainly desirable. This topic, while focusing solely on ASE 
procurement, should be on the minds of all Department of 
Defense (DOD) procurement agencies. This thesis can serve as 
a model to an innovative and sound approach for all 
acquisitions. Ideally, this new approach to ASE procurement 
would foster a wave of continuous acquisition strategy- 
improvements throughout the DOD community. 
This study will make use of the Learning Rate (LR) Theory 
and economic analysis to suggest benefits of the proposed 
strategies in relation to the current ASE acquisition 
strategy. The political realities of this period of change 
include decreasing DOD budgets and decreasing military 
manpower. The acquisition community must, therefore, 
assertively and aggressively endeavor to maximize the 
effectiveness of constrained resources. 
A.  BACKGROUND 
Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) is a crucial 
component for Army combat rotor-craft. Its effective use by 
trained pilots and crews greatly contributes to mission 
accomplishment without loss of lives. Furthermore, it 
safeguards the U.S. Army's equipment and the American 
taxpayer's investment. Today's threat is continuously 
changing and developing and is more uncertain than any ever 
experienced in U.S. history. American pilots and crews 
deserve the best ASE and related training to stand ready to 
defend U.S. interests at any time. 
During OPERATION DESERT SHIELD, 3100 ASE systems were 
sent to Southwest Asia (SWA) to either upgrade existing 
systems or install on aircraft that had no preexisting ASE 
system. [Ref. 1] The U.S. was fortunate to have adequate time 
for this to be accomplished. It may not be so lucky in the 
future. This effort was an accelerated fielding for most of 
the systems. Accelerated, because deployment was not 
scheduled until approximately March of 1992. However, because 
of the imminent war, this monumental task was considered in 
the best interest of U.S. Forces and the Program Manager (PM) 
for Aviation Electronics Combat (AEC, formerly ASE) executed 
this effort by deploying fielding teams and personnel from the 
ASE office to SWA. Some systems were fielded to sister 
services that had not previously planned to use them, but 
because of the impending hostilities, demanded their use. The 
significance of this effort lies in the realization that in 
the  world we  live  in  today,  no  threat  is  certain. 
Furthermore, we may have no warning of when or where this 
uncertain threat may strike. Therefore, it is extremely 
important that our equipment stand ready for hostilities 
before they develop. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The primary objective of this thesis is to suggest 
improvements to the current ASE acquisition strategy. This 
may be possible by analyzing economic lessons learned from the 
current strategy and applying that knowledge to emerging 
RDT&E philosophies, reform initiatives, and innovative 
procurement strategies. The result could be an improved, 
efficient, and streamlined procurement process. The ultimate 
objective, lest we forget, is to ensure that the soldier is 
properly equipped with ASE prior to hostilities. All efforts 
to improve the acquisition process support this major 
objective. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. The primary research question to be answered within 
this thesis is: How can emerging RDT&E philosophies and 
economic analysis serve to improve the current ASE procurement 
strategy while remaining flexible to changing threats? 
2. The subsidiary research questions to be answered 
within this thesis are: 
a.  What has been the dominant ASE procurement 
strategy in the past? 
b. What are the principal considerations that 
determine how and when ASE will be procured during the life- 
cycle of the aircraft? 
c. What are the economic impacts of  2b, above? 
d. How can the use of emerging RDT&E procurement 
philosophies enhance ASE procurement? 
D.  SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Scope 
The scope of this thesis is focused on the economic 
lessons learned through the procurement strategy of the AN/APR 
-39A(V)l and their impacts on emerging acquisition 
philosophies. The AN/APR-39A(V)1 Radar Detecting Set (RDS) is 
an upgraded version of the AN/APR-39(V) 1 system. It uses a 
digital processor, alphanumeric display, and a synthetic voice 
to provide the pilot warning of radar directed air defense 
threat systems. This RDS is applicable to all U.S. Army rotor 
craft. No other system was researched. The reason for this 
focus is twofold: 1) The AEC procurement team felt this 
system adequately represents their previous acquisition 
strategy;  and 2)  Data on this system was readily available. 
2. Limitations 
This study is limited by the currency and dynamics of the 
newly-emerging philosophies of procurement. Data and/or 
written material is scarce. However, this thesis revealed 
several documented articles and will exploit them. Other 
limitations include the dynamics of the current changes 
affecting the DOD.  As I write this thesis, a new change 
involving the use of Military Specifications is taking place. 
The change is to make every use of commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) specifications when possible and use Military 
Specifications (MILSPECS) only as a last resort. I will use 
all current changes that fit the scope of this thesis. 
3.  Assumptions 
1. The need for ASE is already established. 
2. Aircraft survivability equipment procurement 
strategy is independent of a particular aircraft 
(except a new start). 
3. The threat is always unknown. 
4. The economic analysis used in this thesis can be 
taught to procurement agencies in the DOD. 
E.  METHODOLOGY 
I will use the current ASE procurement strategy to 
develop an economic perspective of the AN/APR-3 9A(V)l 
acquisition. After analyzing this information, I will list 
the economic lessons learned. Based on these lessons learned, 
I will apply them to the current changes in acquisition 
streamlining and new innovative thoughts on procurement. The 
result will be recommendations to improve the current ASE 
acquisition strategy. 
The data obtained on the AN/APR-39A(V)1 was through a 
personal field study at the AEC headquarters based in St. 
Louis, Missouri. All other data concerning newly-emerging 
philosophies on RDT&E were gathered through literature reviews 
and/or telephone conversations with authors on those subjects 
(e.g., Cochrane) . 
F.  ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is composed of five chapters. Chapter I 
provides an introduction to the subject of ASE procurement and 
sets the tone for the dynamic environment of the current 
Administration as applied to DOD acquisition. Chapter I also 
contains background information, the thesis objective, 
research questions, scope, limitations, assumptions, and 
methodology. 
Chapter II describes the previous ASE procurement 
strategy and contractual approach. 
Chapter III contains the economic analysis and lessons 
learned. 
Chapter IV provides the reader with several newly 
emerging RDT&E procurement philosophies and technologies, with 
their descriptions. In addition, implications to the 
industrial base for one of these ideas are mentioned. 
Chapter V presents the conclusions and recommendations 
derived from combining the economic analysis and the emerging 
procurement ideas. Areas for further research are also 
presented here. 

II.  PREVIOUS ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
According to the AEC program office, the following 
acquisition strategy for the AN/APR-3 9A(V)1 represents, on an 
average basis, the typical strategy to date for ASE 
procurement. This is the main reason that this system was 
selected for this thesis. I would also like to mention that 
the following strategy was modified from that of the second 
production buy to fit the first buy, although little in the 
second buy was changed from the first. This was necessary due 
to the unavailability of the first production buy strategy. 
Furthermore, I want to acknowledge that the following strategy 
was slightly edited from the reference, but unchanged in 
meaning. Therefore, the strategy follows very closely to Ref. 
2. 
A.  ACQUISITION BACKGROUND & OBJECTIVES 
Present technology has made tremendous progress in the 
aviation community. Particularly, aircraft performance and 
safety have enjoyed significant improvements in recent years. 
Ironically, however, these great technological leaps have 
created a complex atmosphere in the aircraft's cockpit. This 
busy environment, at times, can become quite tasking on the 
pilot's workload, sometimes exceeding his/her human 
capabilities. Add combat situations to this, and the problem 
becomes worse. The AN/APR-39A(V)1 RSDS should reduce the 
combat pressures placed on pilot workload by automatically 
updating, prioritizing, and presenting threat information. 
The AN/APR-39A (V) 1 RSDS is a radar detecting device that 
is capable of detecting multiple types of threats, identifying 
them, and prioritizing them on an indicator located in the 
aircraft's cockpit. Once the prioritization is made, the 
information is then audibly communicated to the pilot through 
the aircraft's intercom system using a synthetic voice. These 
features significantly reduce the pilot's cockpit workload 
during stressful periods and enhance aircraft and crew 
survivability. See Appendix A for a physical description. 
This RSDS system updates the previous AN/APR-39(V)1 
system by incorporating a digital signaling processor as 
compared to an analog signal processor. Digitization 
represents the current wave of military modernization. This 
RSDS is applicable to the current fleet of U.S. Military 
rotor-craft. 
The Full Scale Development (FSD) phase, currently termed 
Engineering Manufacturing and Development (EMD), commenced in 
1982. The FSD contract was awarded to General Instrument, 
Dalmo Victor, Belmont, CA, for $9,450,315. Following this 
contract was a multi-year production contract for $94,919,105 
(as of 5 DEC 89), also awarded sole-source to Dalmo Victor. 
B.  APPLICABLE CONDITIONS 
The AN/APR-39A(V)1 RSDS was developed under an Electronic 
Warfare/Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition 
(EW/RSTA) Center, Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) 
requirement, in response to an intelligence community- 
identified threat. 
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According to the FSD contract awarded to Dalmo Victor, 
the goal was to develop a threat RSDS that would interface 
with the existing equipment on the aircraft. As a result, the 
RSDS was to be compatible with the following systems [Ref. 3]: 
1. AN/ALQ-13 6(V)1/5 Countermeasure Jammer. This 
system is an airborne, automatic, electronic radar 
jammer designed to defeat or degrade the tracking 
capability of hostile threat pulse radars. When 
threat signals are identified and verified, jamming 
automatically begins and continues until the threat 
radar signal is no longer detected. The system 
then ceases jamming, but continues to receive and 
analyze radar signals. [Ref. 4] 
2. AN/AVR - 2 Laser Warning Receiver. The 
AN/AVR -2 is a passive laser warning system that 
receives, processes and displays threat information 
resulting from aircraft illumination by lasers. 
The threat information is displayed on the AN/APR - 
3 9A(V)1 RSDS indicator in the cockpit. [Ref. 4] 
3. Friendly radar systems that reject the display 
of allied aircraft. 
4. Night vision goggles (NVGs) and other NVG and secure 
lighting requirements. 
Because of the successes of the original AN/APR-39, the 
Government gained high levels of confidence in the contractor 




A Design to Cost (DTC) goal of $20,581 was included in 
the FSD contract to keep costs low. A Firm-Fixed-Price 
contract would incentivize the contractor to achieve the 
lowest possible cost. 
2. Application of Should Cost 
A Should Cost Analysis (SCA) was conducted for the first 
production effort and was not planned for the second 
production. The Government is confident that sufficient 
competitive sources are available to ensure economic 
efficiency. 
D. PERFORMANCE 
The AN/APR-39A(V)1 RSDS can identify the threat by type 
and warn the pilot of the threat by using a synthetic voice 
and digital symbols. When a pilot faces a multiple threat 
environment, the RSDS can detect the most dangerous threat and 
inform the pilot of such, while prioritizing the remaining 
threats. 
E. RISK 
1.  Cost 
The cost risk is considered moderate. The production 
hardware cost estimate, based on Design to Unit Production 
Cost (DTUPC), was closely tracked and monitored during the 
Engineering Development (ED) program.  The DTUPC estimate 
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appeared to be realistic based on the contractor's proposal. 
2. Technical 
Since the development of this system began in the early 
1970's, the design and proposed manufacturing techniques have 
stabilized. In fact, the manufacturing techniques to be used 
in the production are considered state-of-the-art and were 
demonstrated during the FSD phase. The system was technically 
mature, so minimal design changes were anticipated. 
Therefore, the technical risk was considered low. 
3. Schedule 
With initial productions, schedule trade-offs cannot be 
written off. Since no prior history on the contractor's 
delivery performance existed, schedule risk was considered 
moderate. 
The contractor was to begin testing twelve (12) First 
Article Test (FAT) units approximately eighteen (18) months 
after the contract award. This would allow time for 
Government inspection before the initial delivery of 
production units. Delivery of the initial production units 
was scheduled to begin twenty-four (24) months after award. 
The production rate was scheduled to peak at seventy (70) 
systems per month. 
F.  ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
First, I would like to mention that the AEC PM does not 
determine the aircraft priorities for the ASE systems that he 
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is responsible for procuring. The Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Operations (DCSOPS), Aviation, decides which units will 
receive a particular ASE system and in what quantities. [Ref. 
5] This is important to note because it frees the PM of 
dealing with possible bitterness among commanders who feel 
that their unit is more important than others. The PM can, 
therefore, focus solely on the acquisition aspect and then 
deliver the systems to the designated users. The economic 
impacts of the basis of when and who will receive any ASE can 
often be political. Therefore, these decisions may not always 
be in the best economic interests of the PM. Nevertheless, 
this is the system (for now). 
1. Program Structure/Approach 
The Government managed many facets of the program to 
include meetings, reports, and on-site visits to monitor the 
contractor's progress. The level-three drawings and Technical 
Data Package (TDP) would also be purchased for use in future 
production efforts. The program also had provisions for a 
make or buy program and offered Government-Furnished Equipment 
(GFE) as required. 
2. Tailored Features 
No significant tailoring was accomplished, but emphasis 
was placed on value engineering. This was particularly 
important if a producer other than the developer would receive 
the production contract. Furthermore, value engineering 
changes would increase system performance and/or decrease 
cost. 
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3. Supportability, Transportability 
Interim contractor logistical support was an issue since 
this was the first production buy. The maintenance concept, 
however, was consistent with the doctrinal three level 
approach for Army aircraft. The three levels are: Aviation 
Unit Maintenance (AVUM), Aviation Intermediate Maintenance 
(AVIM), and Depot Maintenance (DM) . Emphasis at the AVUM 
level was on removal and replacement of major subassemblies. 
At the AVIM level, repair of subassemblies for quick return to 
AVUM was the support goal. Depot level maintenance, 
therefore, is expected to repair major assemblies beyond the 
AVIM capabilities. 
Spare parts necessary to support the RSDS would be 
procured in accordance with AR 725-50. 
4. Production and Industrial Preparedness 
As with any first-time productions, produceability was 
originally an issue. Additionally, ease of manufacturing and 
assembly was a major concern to keep costs low and to transfer 
manufacturing to other contractors if desired. Creating an 
industrial base in follow-on productions was also addressed 
and desired. 
5. Test and Evaluation 
Production line testing and FAT would be required as per 
the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). 
6. Computer Resources 
By its very nature, the AN/APR-39A(V) 1- relies extensively 
on computer resources. The Communications Electronic Command 
for Software Engineering (CECOM CSE) was tasked to maintain 
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the software details and baseline for this RSDS. Any changes 
desired by the contractor or other producer would require 
approval from the PM through CECOM. This was necessary to 
ensure contract validity and to keep the PM informed and in 
charge. Software documentation and software status reports, 
as necessary, were also required and maintained by the CECOM 
CSE. 
7. Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) 
No potential hazards existed before production. 
8. Electric Power and Environmental Impact 
Electrical, electromagnetic interference, and 
environmental studies completed during the development phase 
raised no serious issues. 
9. Cost Drivers and Discipline 
Continual attention throughout the life-cycle of this 
system will be asserted to meet the cost goals established 
early in the development phase. Baseline Cost Estimates (BCE) 
and DTCs were also initiated during development to set goals 
for production costs. A DTC goal of $20,581 (constant FY 82 
dollars) was specified in the EMD contract. Any cost savings 
to the Government would be shared with Dalmo Victor as a 90/10 
split, respectively. The Government was confident in the cost 
estimates and had assurances that no major cost drivers 
existed prior to production. 
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10. Quality and Risk Management 
This RSDS system incorporated mature technologies and 
represented low technical and cost risks. No milestone III 
"showstoppers" were anticipated or encountered. 
Quality was managed by the Government through several 
avenues. One way the Government monitored quality was through 
on-site contractor facility surveillance. This was 
accomplished by personnel assigned to the Defense Contract 
Administration Service (DCAS, now DCMC), CECOM Product 
Assurance, and AEC Program Management Office (PMO). Other 
methods that measured quality were scheduled program reviews, 
conferences, and special meetings as required. 
11. Vulnerability, Survivability and Endurance 
Biological and chemical protection for this system were 
not designed into this RSDS. The aircraft in which the 
equipment operates would provide this protection as 
appropriate. Nuclear and Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) 
hardening were not required of the system. 
12. Contract Approach 
The type of contract anticipated and negotiated was a 
Firm-Fixed-Price contract. This procurement was for the 
initial production of the AN/APR-39A(V)1 RSDS. Again, the 
technology involved in the system was current and no 
significant technical risks existed. This was the driving 
factor for using a Firm-Fixed-Price contract. Furthermore, 
the design baseline was stable. 
The benefits of using this type of contract were as 
follows: 
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1. Minimum Government risk 
2. Reduced Administrative burden for both the contractor 
and the Government 
3. Incentive for the contractor to control costs 
4. Incentive for the contractor to maximize efficiency 
13.  Negotiation Environment 
The Government recognized that cost estimation is, at 
best, an educated guess. The Government, therefore, took the 
position of offering a fair and reasonable price for the 
delivered systems. 
G.  ACQUISITION STRATEGY SUMMARY 
Because the AN/APR-39A(V)1 represented mature technology, 
technical risks were considered low. Contractor performance, 
however, was a moderate risk because the Government had no 
historical data on Dalmo Victor. However, because the design 
baseline was stable, the Government felt confident in using a 
Firm-Fixed-Price contractual approach. This placed the major 
cost risk burden on the contractor to produce at the DTC goal. 
Additionally, multi-year options and data rights were also 
included in the contract to allow the Government flexibility 
in future year procurements. 
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III.  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this economic analysis is to determine, 
through the use of the LR, the economic lessons learned by the 
Government in its procurement of the AN/APR-39A(V)1 RSDS. 
Additionally, the purpose is to apply any lessons learned from 
this analysis to the new emerging procurement philosophies 
contained in the next chapter in order to enhance the current 
ASE acquisition strategy. Before the contract was negotiated 
and let, several on-site visits and audits were conducted by 
various Government agencies. Their purpose was to validate 
the contractor's cost estimates and to ensure that the 
contractor met certain criteria, for example, adequate 
accounting procedures and facilities. The visits also 
measured the contractor's capacity to fulfill the requirements 
set forth in the contract. I found these audits very 
beneficial to the Government by reducing unjustified or 
questionable costs. The analysis that follows was conducted 
after the first production buy and will serve to illustrate 
the economic lessons learned from this acquisition. 
The methodology that I will use is fourfold. First, I 
will analyze the cost data for this acquisition and determine, 
if, in fact, a 90% LR was attained. Second, if a 90% LR was 
or was not attained, examine possible reasons to explain the 
difference. Third, I will determine the utility to the 
Government based on the actual outcome of the purchase. 
Fourth, I will explain the lessons learned from this analysis. 
Since the contract was negotiated with an agreed-to LR of 90%, 
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one would expect the achieved LR to be approximately 90%. 
Before I begin the analysis, let me briefly explain the 
learning curve theory. 
A.  LEARNING RATE 
A learning rate is not an abstract concept but rather a 
fairly intuitive one. The meaning of a learning rate is that 
given a particular repetitive task or function (such as 
automobile assembly lines or parts component assembly lines) 
to perform, there is a degree of learning that occurs 
enabling the performer of such task to become more efficient. 
As the person continues to perform this particular function, 
and provided that he or she is not disrupted or there is a 
change in procedure, he or she can increase his output without 
added time or maintain a given output with time savings . The 
efficiency gained through repetitive tasks and processes 
increases with time because of the habitual familiarity of the 
task. "The power of the learning curve is such that in some 
firms unit labor costs have declined 10 to 15% each time 
output is doubled." [Ref. 6] Learning rate, learning curve, 
and experience curve all relate to the phenomenon that I have 
discussed above. An important thing to note about LRs is that 
the process or function must be left to stabilize. The 
worker, in addition, must be free from undue job disturbances. 
Only through repetition, stability, familiarity, and no or 
little variance, can an LR be achieved and improved upon. If 
Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) are required, the LR will 
normally be disturbed.  The significance of the change will 
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determine how much of the learning process will be lost. If 
a drastic change is made, then one can expect that the entire 
achieved LR will be lost. On the other hand, if an ECP is 
minimal, perhaps only a "bump" in the learning curve will 
occur and not all of the familiarity of the task will be lost. 
Besides a stable process, other factors are important to 
help create an overall non-disruptive environment. The first 
thing that comes to mind is personnel. Even in an environment 
that relies on extensive automation, personnel stability is 
necessary to achieve a steady LR. Personnel turbulence causes 
disruptions and negatively impacts the learning curve. In 
less automated environments, high personnel turnover is more 
serious due to the loss in continuity. At least in the 
automated environment there is machinery to provide the 
desired long term smoothness. Because personnel stability is 
required to achieve an effective LR, the burden of satisfying 
the employees must become an objective of management. This is 
challenging for managers because, as mentioned earlier, the 
learning rates are commonly associated with repetitive tasks 
that are extremely difficult to make enjoyable. The working 
environment is also important. The managers and supervisors 
must also not have a high turnover ratio. If managers inflict 
changes (which are common to different management styles) upon 
the process, disruptions to the LR are likely to occur. 
However small a change might be, the change to the LR may put 
a "bump" in the curve. The last thing that comes to mind for 
achieving an environment conducive to learning curve growth is 
constant flow.   What I mean by constant flow is that 
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production lines should not produce at a level so high that 
they have to shut down periodically because they exceed the 
demand. If an employee works for two weeks and then is "off" 
for two weeks because production has stopped, the learning 
curve growth is seriously jeopardized. A constant, steady 
flow of production ensures the greatest possible LR growth 
potential. Below are three learning curve examples that 









This learning curve represents an ideal situation 
where a stable environment exists. As the output 
quantity increases, the unit price decreases at a 







At various points along a process, disturbing 











This learning curve represents a major change to 
the process or complete new job force.  In this 
case all initial learning was lost (smallest line) 
and a new curve created.  Note the new higher 
initial quantity price (longest line). 
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1.  Learning Rate Formula 




Yx = cost of the xth unit 
X = xth unit 
a = theoretical first unit cost 
b = mathematical slope of the learning 
curve 
b = log (LR)/log 2 
LR = learning rate 
2.  Learning Rate Example 
If a learning rate of 90% is estimated, and the 
theoretical first unit cost of an item is $200.00, find the 
cost of the tenth item. 
Solution: 
Substitute  the given information into the  formula 
provided above. 
LR = .9       a = 200 X = 10 
Therefore, 
Y(10) = (200)x(10)lo3(-9)/10^ 
So, Y(10) = 140.94 
Conclusion:  The expected cost of the tenth unit, given 
a 90% learning rate, is $140.94. 
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B.  CONTRACTOR COSTS 
With a learning rate of 90%, the cost of the 10th unit 
becomes 70% of the first unit and the cost of the 50th unit 
becomes 55% of the first unit. Table 1, below, shows how the 
production cost of a unit decreases with an increased 
cumulative production for a learning rate of 90%. 
Production 
of ith unit 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Relative 
cost of ith 
unit 
1 0.7 0 .63 0.6 0.57 0.55 0 .54 0.52 0.51 0.5 0.5 
Table 1 
Relative Percentage Cost of Cumulative Production 
The total cost of producing Q units, TC(Q), can then be 
computed as a sum of marginal cost as follows: 
TC(Q)=X(X=l,Q)aXb *   {a/(b+l)}{Qb+1-l} 
and the unit cost of producing Q units, UC(Q), is given by 
dividing the total cost by the quantity: 
UC(Q)=TC(Q)/Q = {a/Q*(b+l)}{Qb+1-l} 
Table 2, below, shows the effect of 90% learning in terms 
of the reduction in total cost as well as unit cost when the 
cost of the initial unit is given as "a." Each production run 
is assumed to produce 500 units in this illustration. The 
Table, for example, shows that the first 500 units cost 228a, 
the second 500 units cost 183a, the third 500 units cost 169a, 
and the last 500 units cost 160a to produce. The cost 
reduction of 20%, 6%, and 4% is achieved as more production 
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Total Cost Unit Cost Relative 
Unit Cost 
1 500 500 228a 0 .46a 100% 
2 500 1000 183a 0 .37a 80% 
3 500 1500 169a 0.34a 74% 
4 500 2000 160a 0 .32a 70% 
Table 2 
Cost of Producing 500 Units 
C.  ANALYSIS 
With this understanding of the Learning Curve, I will 
examine the outcome of the AN/APR-39A(V)1 first production 
buy. The learning rate [and DTUPC] considers the following 
recurring costs: engineering direct labor, engineering 
overhead, manufacturing direct labor, manufacturing overhead, 
G&A material, and profit associated with production. [Ref. 3] 
Table 3, below, based on [Ref. 3], shows that despite the 
assumption of a 90% LR, the relative production cost does not 
seem to decline as expected. In fact, the unit costs for MY1 
and MY2 measured in then-year dollars are identical between 
these production runs. Since the proper comparison of unit 
cost must be made in constant-year dollar terms, the relative 












(then year $) 
Cost per 
Output 




MY1 474 474 $17,548,428 $37,022 100% 
MY2 587 1, 061 $21,731,914 $37,022 100% 
0P1 948 2, 009 $30,612,822 $32,292 87.2% 
OP2 1,174 3, 183 $37,786,364 $32,186 86 . 9% 
Table 3 
Actual Production and Cost Experience for AN/APR-39A(V)1 
Table 4, below, compares the actual relative unit cost 
and the theoretical relative unit cost using the realized 
production level for these runs. The fourth column is 
computed using an average annual inflation rate of 4% to 
convert the then-year dollar figures to constant-MYl dollar 
figures. For this computation, the MY2 production was 
scheduled to take place nine months after MY1; OP1 production 





































Comparison of Actual vs. Theoretical Relative Unit Cost 
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Even after the correction for the escalation, however, 
the actual relative unit cost seems to be more expensive than 
the theoretical level. This may be due to the fact, that not 
all cost components included in the actual costs are subject 
to the learning phenomenon. For example, the raw material used 
in production may not be subject to learning as much as the 
direct labor hours used in production. To adjust for this, 
the relative unit cost was computed as a function of a 
percentage subject to learning, ß. Let Z be the total initial 
variable cost, a the part subject to learning, and m the part 
not subject to learning. Then we have Z=a+m, where a=ßZ, and 
m=(l-ß)Z. Table 5, below, shows the relative unit cost for 
varying ß values with ß=(l, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2, 0). 
p 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 Actual 
MY1 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
MY2 80% 87% 92% 95% 98% 100% 97% 
OP1 72% 82% 88% 93% 97% 100% 82% 
OP2 66% 78% 86% 92% 96% 100% 79% 
Table 5 
Relative Unit Cost as a Function of ß 
As expected, the more costs are subject to learning, the 
greater the cost reduction. On the other hand, if nothing 
were subject to learning (ie., ß=0) , then the production cost 
remains the same regardless of the cumulative production as 
shown in the sixth column. The assumption of ß=80% seems to 
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produce a more consistent relative cost profile to the actual 
experience. However, even in this case, the MY2 figure 
diverges by a significant amount. This may be interpreted as 
either the MYl payment was too low, or that the MY2 payment 
was too high, or possibly both. In view of these potential 
inconsistencies between the actual experience and the theory, 
the production cost estimates [Ref. 3] made by the contractor, 
as well as the Government, were closely examined. 
Table 6, below, shows that all estimates are very similar 
to each other in relative terms. Two features are prominent 
in the table: one is a large cost reduction (more than 50%) 
from the MYl production run to the MY2 production run; the 
second is the relative similarity of the costs for the MY2, 
OP1 and OP2 production runs. 













MYl 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
MY2 49% 49% 48% 45% 49% 48% 
OP1 50% 49% 49% 49% 49% 49% 
OP2 52% 51% 50% 49% 48% 50% 
Table 6 
Relative Unit Cost Estimates 
These characteristics are consistent within an analytical 
framework when a small proportion of learning, for example ß 
in the 30% range (consistent with Ref. 3), is assumed and an 
inclusion of fixed cost in MYl cost figures.  With these 
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adjustments, Table 7, below, shows the relative unit costs 









MYl 100% 100% 100% 
MY2 49% 48% 98% 
0P1 49% 49% 82% 
0P2 48% 50% 79% 
Table 7, Relative Unit Costs with 30% of 
Costs Subject to Learning 
Although the costs estimates made by the contractor and 
the Government can be reproduced, it seems that the actual 
"cost" experience, in terms of a 90% LR, does not follow from 
the LR theory. However, a closer examination and analysis 
revealed an interesting account of this acquisition. The 
paragraphs that follow describe this account. 
It appears that the unit "costs" used for MYl and MY2 do 
not truly reflect the costs of production, but rather they 
reflect a mutually agreed payment scheme. In fact, the 
Government and the contractor first negotiated one set of 
prices (without leveling) based on costs, and then negotiated 
another final price (with leveling). These prices are 
reflected below in Table 8. 
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MY1 $38,634,324 $81,507 $30,417,997 $64,173 
MY2 $21,620,852 $36,833 $29,837,179 $50,830 
TOTAL $60,255,176 $60,255,176 
Table 8 
Negotiated Prices 
If, in fact, this analysis through an agreed payment 
scheme is correct, the Government seems to have gained a high 
degree of utility by levelizing prices at the expense of the 
contractor. The high degree of utility is explained in the 
amount of savings the Government obtained. This was possible 
because the Government was able to defer the payment of 
$8,216,327 (the difference of $38,634,324 and $30,417,997) for 
nine months. This savings is illustrated below by computing 
the present value (PV) of the Government's payment streams. 
A Government discount rate of 7%, as directed by the Office of 
Management and Budget (0MB), is used in this calculation. 
PV(Alt 1)=$38,634,324 + $21, 620 , 852/(1. 07) 9/12 = $59 , 185 , 419 
PV(Alt 2)=$30,417,997 + $29 , 837 , 179/(1. 07) 9/12 = $58 , 778 , 892 
Therefore, the Government savings is PV(Altl) - PV(Alt2), 
which equals $406,528. Further study of this payment scheme 
reveals an even better option that enables the contractor to 
gain, as well. 
Another alternative that is a more mutually attractive 
settlement than Alternative 2 can be constructed. This is 
because the discount rate applicable to the Government is much 
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lower than that of the contractor. With a higher discount 
rate for the contractor, the deferment of the payment into the 
future is more expensive for him. Therefore, the Government 
can arrange a less leveling payment scheme that is mutually 
more satisfactory than Alternative 2. To see this, you will 
first compute the contractor's present values of the payment 
using a hypothetical, but certainly reasonable, discount rate 
of 14%. 
PV(Altl)=$38,634,324 + $21, 620 , 852/(1.14) 9/12 = $58 , 231, 530 
PV(Alt2)=$30,417,997 + $29, 837 , 179/(1.14) 9/l2 = $57 , 462 , 507 
This shows that Alternative 2 is quite costly and the 
contractor's loss equals PV(Altl) - PV(Alt2) or $1,772,912 
(under the original scheme).   If Alternative 2 is indeed 
acceptable to the contractor,  this alternative does not 
maximize  the  gain  to  the Government.    Another plan, 
Alternative 3, can be constructed to maximize the Government's 
gain without making the contractor worse off than Alternative 
2. 
Alternative 3 is constructed by reducing the payment 
stream in Alternative 1 by $769,023 in MY1 (this amount is 
chosen so that the contractor's PV remains the same as in 
Alternative 2). Similarly, the contractor's gain can be 
improved without reducing the gain to the Government. 
Alternative 4 is constructed by reducing the payment stream in 
Alternative 1 by $406,528 in MY1. Under Alternative 4, the PV 
to the Government remains the same as in Alternative 2, 
however, the PV to the contractor is increased by $362,496. 
This is the maximum gain to the contractor without changing 
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the benefit to the Government from Alternative 2 . Because of 
this, a more attractive payment scheme to both parties could 
be constructed. Alternative 5 illustrates this "win/win" 
situation. The contractor gains as well as the Government. 
This can be accomplished by reducing the payment in MY1 by 
some value between $406,528 to $769,023. For example, 
Alternative 5 is constructed by reducing MY1 by $500,000. The 
gain to the Government is $93,472 and the gain to the 
contractor is $269,023. These Alternatives an PVs are shown in 


















MYl $30,417,997 $37,865,301 $38,227,796 $38,134,324 
MY2 $29,837,179 $21,620,852 $21,620,852 $21,620,852 














Alternatives and PVs 
This economic analysis, through the use of the LR, showed 
that The Government and the contractor are fairly adept at 
applying LRs to cost estimation. Exactly how to determine 
what LR percentage applies to a specific project was not 
investigated. The analysis revealed that approximately 30% of 
direct production costs were subject to learning in this ASE 
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production. This figure may vary from contractor to 
contractor, however, it may be used as a guideline for 
Government cost estimating in similar electronic components 
production or in future ASE acquisitions. Variations to this 
baseline may be caused by many unknowns, such as labor 
trainability, steady production cycles, and exact personnel 
turnover rates. Furthermore, when applying future economic 
conditions, such as inflation rates and labor and material 
escalation costs, to out-year price reductions involving the 
learning rate, the estimation becomes extremely difficult. 
Although, initially, there appeared to be some 
discrepancies in the application of a 90% LR with regard to 
actual costs, this analysis discovered that a 90% LR was, in 
fact, used in theory and the actual experience seems to 
corroborate the rate. However, when looking only at the 
actual payments over the period of the contract, and not 
investigating the disparity, there is a temptation to 
prematurely conclude that the applied LR was substantially 
less than 90%. Fortunately, this was not true. Quite the 
opposite was true. It seems that the Government achieved a 
higher degree of utility than expected. This is evident in 
the way it was able to negotiate price leveling with the 
contractor. Not only did the Government meet cost and 
schedule goals, but it also was able to defer certain 
payments by levelizing the MY1 and MY2 unit costs. This 
resulted in cost savings to the Government. Whether or not 
this was actually planned is not certain. Perhaps a 
Government funding ceiling was exceeded and the contractor, 
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eager for a contract, was willing to forgo current cash flows 
by discounting the first production units, in return for the 
security of a contract award. Then, in later years, he could 
increase the price (which causes the appearance of not 
applying a 9 0% LR) , while staying within Government funding 
limits. Regardless of the real reason, it seems, however, 
that the Government could have done even better by 
negotiating an alternative, such as Alternative 3 discussed in 
Table 9, that would have allowed the Government an additional 
$362,496. The contractor's gain would have been unchanged. 
Nevertheless, it seems certain that careful attention to the 
pricing scheme or methods of obligating contracts can have 
significant benefits to the Government as this acquisition 
showed. 
D.  LESSONS LEARNED 
1. The study and use of Learning Rates in DOD agencies 
warrants continued training for leverage in contract 
negotiations and cost estimating. 
2. PMs should insist on a definitive price for the 
theoretical first unit cost. 
3. Labor and material escalations should be applied 
separately from the LR. 
4. SCA teams and DCAA audits are extremely beneficial to 
the Government in examining contractor proposed costs. 
5. Only a portion of the production recurring costs are 
subject to the LR theory (approx. 30% in this case). 
6. Because the Government has a lower discount rate than 
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contractors have, deferment of payments and other pricing 
schemes should be carefully examined for their final 
implications. 
The  next  chapter  presents  new  philosophies  in 
procurement, emerging technologies, and acquisition reform, 
that when mixed with the lessons learned in this chapter, 
could serve to develop an improved ASE procurement strategy. 
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IV.  EMERGING RDT&E PHILOSOPHIES AND TECHNOLOGIES 
After analyzing the previous ASE procurement strategy for 
the AN/APR-39A(V)1 and extracting the economic lessons 
learned, I would now like to introduce several new trends in 
military procurement philosophies. Because of their newness, 
I do not espouse to be the expert on these trends, but wish to 
simply convey what I have learned through literature research 
and conversations with the AEC program office. I would like 
to point out, however, that these emerging philosophies are 
unprecedented in that they were virtually unheard of several 
years ago. But with the newly-created environment of accepted 
change and acquisition reform, not only are these ideas 
greatly accepted, but are the first waves of innovativeness. 
Furthermore, I predict that we will begin to see more 
creativity within the next year and a half to two years. 
After discussing the new philosophies, I will then apply 
the economic lessons learned from the previous chapter to a 
selected number of them and determine their potential value to 
the ASE program office. The economic value is important to 
discern because resources are continually constrained and 
highly scrutinized. Any effort to procure military equipment 
without considering the optimal usage of these limited 
resources is thwarted. The objective, therefore, is to 
determine which new philosophy or trend is most economically 
promising, if at all beneficial. The following paragraphs 
will discuss selected new trends. Unless otherwise noted, 
they were obtained from [Ref. 8]. 
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A.  NEW PHILOSOPHIES 
1.  Long Shadows 
This philosophy was suggested in 1990 by Ted Gold and 
Rich Wagner. The central theme behind long shadows is to 
persuade potential adversaries that the U.S. has the 
capability to create new systems from concept to production at 
a fast enough rate so as to render any military aggression 
futile. Hence, through continuous research and development 
(and a strong industrial base) a "long shadow" is cast 
forward. Simply put, this is a deterrent in the form of 
potential  U.S. Military might. 
An example of long shadow is the Strategic Defense 
Initiative. [Ref. 8]. This initiative, also known as "Star 
Wars," was strongly supported and encouraged by former 
President Ronald Reagan. Through space-based missile systems, 
the United States would protect its homeland from incoming 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) by launching 
missiles from the space-based platforms, thereby destroying 
the threat missiles in mid-air prior to reaching the U.S. 
Although highly speculative, this (potential) system may have 
significantly contributed to the demise of the former Soviet 
Union. After all, wouldn't we be concerned for our national 
security if we learned that China possesses this capability? 
Just the thought of it should wake up ghosts of the "Pearl 
Harbor Syndrome." 
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2. Research and Development (R&D) Rollover 
This new philosophy was presented by former Secretary of 
Defense, Les Aspin in 1990. The concept in this new way of 
procuring military equipment was to maintain programs at 
advanced development stages while still performing significant 
R&D in the system. Once production begins, it would 
incorporate the latest technologies as discovered in 
continuous R&D efforts. 
Two military programs, the Army's new light helicopter, 
the Reconnaissance Attack Helicopter (RAH-66), Comanche, and 
the Air Force's Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) are examples 
of this philosophy. An added feature of this procurement 
philosophy (provided that time is not critical) is that both 
technologies and production and manufacturing techniques are 
allowed to mature before the final design specifications are 
"locked in." 
3. Just-in-time-Weapons 
Yes, this is similar to the concept of just-in-time 
inventory. The idea behind this thought is that particular 
systems or weapons would be fielded upon mobilization. Out of 
all the new trends or ideas presented here, this one has 
perhaps the most risks. After all, whose crystal ball would 
be used to determine the backward timing sequence from the 
start of the next unknown war? 
4. Hover 
This concept is similar to that of the Research and 
Development (R&D) Rollover. Programs would continue in R&D to 
refine technologies and reduce risks and costs.  However, 
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before obtaining the production decision, there would be three 
options:  "Cancel, hover, or advance to the next phase." 
The decision to cancel may be necessary because of a 
change in user requirements or perhaps a threat failed to 
materialize, thereby negating the need for a particular weapon 
or system. The Army's Comanche Program faced this dilemma 
after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Congressional 
pressure almost killed the program in late 1994, but the Army 
was able to save it. However, the preservation of this 
program meant dropping it to a "prototype program." Of 
course, the schedule has slipped considerably. 
A decision to "hover" would be based on a factors that 
still necessitate the weapon or system, but deployment of it 
is no longer required as scheduled. An example of when a 
hover decision may be appropriate, is if a perceived threat 
did, in fact, materialize, but for any given reason, has 
suffered a major setback in its ability employ its forces. 
Therefore, a hover decision could benefit a program by buying 
time for R&D or modeling and simulations. 
A decision to proceed to production would be based on an 
immediate need to defend against a threat that did materialize 
or has commenced hostilities. 
5.  Lean Production 
This concept was introduced by top Air Force Officials in 
1992. Lean Production is a thought to produce only a small 
amount of a new weapon or system at an efficient rate. By 
doing this, units that would ultimately be fielded the 
particular system would become operationally proficient with 
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it. Therefore, when hostilities commence, the unit does not 
require additional training with the system and can respond 
accordingly. This notion, by implication, renders "Just-In- 
Time Weapons" and "Shelving Technology" (discussed later) 
inappropriate. Service members must be able to sufficiently 
train with new equipment to achieve the highest degree of 
combat effectiveness before they can deploy and fight with a 
new piece of military hardware/software. Technology and 
production cannot sit around. 
I would also like to add that the Lean Production concept 
implies that the industrial base (a large factor that cannot 
be ignored when considering these new philosophies, but is 
beyond the scope of this thesis) must also be kept "hot" or 
"wet." In other words, the producibility of a particular 
weapon or system must be tried and tested before it can be 
readied for mass production. Technologies that sit on a shelf 
until needed may not be producible. On the other hand, they 
may be producible at a much larger price than anticipated or 
with significant modifications. Producing a "lean" amount 
would solidify production. 
6.  Shelving Technology 
This is a notion that implies complete development of new 
technologies and systems, but not producing them until 
absolutely necessary to counter a particular threat. In a 
sense, this could be viewed as a "hover" decision. The major 
difference, however, is that shelving technology implies a 
more long-term decision to delay production. The decision to 
hover, on the other hand, suggests a more optimistic view of 
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entering production sooner. Currently, I am aware of one 
program that has used this concept of shelving technology: 
the "M6 Discharger." The M6 Discharger is the future 
generation smoke-grenade discharger consisting of four launch 
tubes. [Ref. 9] The decision to "shelve" the program was made 
on the basis that it was ahead of the development of any 
future vehicles. Since no regulations existed on how to 
shelve technology, an intuitive plan was developed and 
separated into three sections: 1. Technical Data Package 
(TDP), 2. Logistics Support Analysis, and 3. Interface for 
the Vehicle. 
The TDP shelving plan contains all information 
gained during development. Additionally, the TDP 
also lists suggestions for alternate manufacturing 
and inspection methods not verified during 
development.[Ref. 9] 
The logistics support analysis plan lists the methods by 
which logistical data should be incorporated into the host 
vehicle technical manual (TM). Because the host vehicles do 
not presently exist, considerable effort was expended to 
carefully document all logistical and operational concerns 
learned during the development process. The task of 
incorporating the M6 Discharger operating and maintenance 
characteristics will then fall on the developers of the host 
vehicle. [Ref. 9] Excruciating detail in documentation is, 
therefore, very important. 
The  interface data  section of  the plan  included 
information on electrical cable connections and mounting 
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hardware. However, such interface materials must be developed 
for the specific host vehicle. Therefore, future developers 
must fit the interface elements according to their specific 
vehicle by relying on data left from the test vehicles. [Ref. 
9] 
To date, I have heard considerable controversy over the 
idea of "shelving technology." One of the major issues 
concerns the industrial base. While those industrial base 
issues could occupy a thesis in itself, let me briefly 
discuss a few. One issue is cost. How costly would it be to 
maintain an industrial base (especially if the new technology 
requires beyond state-of-the-art equipment and facilities) 
that is sitting around waiting for permission to begin 
production? Costs could be astronomical! Now let us assume 
that the required industrial base exists and has sufficient 
workflow that cost is no longer an issue. The next possible 
issue is technological obsolescence. By the time the decision 
to begin production is made, does the threat possess new 
capabilities that render the technology obsolete? The threat 
could have made considerable advances in his own weaponry that 
call for different countermeasures to defeat it. In this 
case, technological improvements to the existing "shelved 
technology" may not be sufficient to counter the threat's 
advancement. Instead, a totally new approach may be 
warranted. Other issues include, ramp-up time, tooling, and 
machinery, to name a few. Consideration of the industrial 
base is imperative when planning on shelving technology. 
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B.   NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
In addition to the new philosophies described above, 
there are several new technologies that are coming of age and 
gaining significant appeal as the acquisition realm continues 
to seek improvement. Without saying, a major goal in 
acquisition reform is to spend less money while still 
procuring quality equipment. 
In the light of emerging technologies, one stands out as 
most promising: "virtual prototyping." This concept can be 
viewed along the same lines as computer-aided design and 
computer-aided manufacturing (CAD/CAM). The DOD definition of 
a virtual prototype is: 
A computer-based simulation of a system or 
subsystem with a degree of functional realism 
comparable to a physical prototype,- 
and virtual prototyping  as: 
The process of using a virtual prototype, in lieu 
of a physical prototype, for test and evaluation 
of specific characteristics of a candidate design. 
[Ref. 10] 
Virtual prototyping promises to explore new concepts of 
weapon systems or other military items from the concept 
exploration phase to the production phase. The Tank and 
Automotive Command (TACOM) has been experimenting with this 
concept for several years now. In fact, they have also 
researched and experimented with virtual manufacturing.  In 
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this regard, simulated factories try to produce the virtual 
prototype to determine the feasibility of producing the 
simulated designs. Imagine the resourcefulness of using 
simulations to explore new visions that can consider almost 
all facets of a system's life-cycle! Before any physical 
models are built, simulated models can be extensively 
designed, redesigned, and even tested. As a result, numerous 
design changes and product improvements can be effectively 
incorporated into the system prior to actual material usage. 
In the acquisition environment, virtual prototyping will cover 
the following: 
In the context of military procurement, a virtual 
prototyping environment would address:  engineering 
design concerns of the developer, process concerns 
of the manufacturer, logistical concerns of the 
maintainer, and training and doctrinal concerns 
of the warfighter. [Ref. 10] 
This emerging technology possesses unlimited potential. 
Because of the military drawdown and the decreased military 
budget, this new concept promises significant cost savings by 
extensively examining new conceptual military products through 
computer aided simulation and testing. Traditional costs 
from the Concept Exploration phase to the EMD phase, 
therefore, will be reduced enormously. 
C.  IMPROVED ACQUISITION PROCESS 
Coupled with the new philosophies and technologies 
mentioned above, are other efforts that I also consider as 
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innovative methods of future procurement. And quite possibly, 
when tied to the ideas mentioned above, they can achieve 
astounding results. In the following paragraphs I will 
discuss two endeavors that aim toward an improved acquisition 
process. These endeavors are, Open Systems Architecture, and 
the DOD directive to switch to performance and commercial 
specifications when military specifications are not necessary. 
1.  Open Systems Architecture 
Open systems architecture comprises a set of mutually 
accepted industry standards for electrical interfaces. Here 
are two definitions used when talking about Open Systems: 
ELECTRONICS SYSTEM: The combination of 
digital/analog, radio frequency, and electro- 
optical hardware, firmware, and software required 
to satisfy one or more functions. 
OPEN SYSTEM: Design and construction of a system 
using public or non-proprietary methods and 
products based on consensus-based standards for 
interfaces of hardware, software, tools, and 
architecture.  [Ref. 11] 
By using open systems, the DOD can procure military equipment 
without worrying about the proprietary rights of any given 
defense contractor. This saves money. The architecture of 
the system would be "open," and, therefore, non-proprietary. 
More simply, no particular contractor or agency could claim 
ownership of an "open" standard. The logistical support of the 
equipment should become less painful, therefore, as many more 
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suppliers (versus the solitary owner of a non-standard system) 
would be able to compete for spare parts deliverables. Colonel 
Thomas E. Reinkober, on 16 September 1994, in the "Open 
Systems Working Group Outbrief" to Mr. Longuemare, the former 
acting Under Secretary Of Defense (Acquisition and 
Technology), described the vision for Open Systems 
Architecture: 
Facilitate lower life-cycle costs for DOD weapon 
systems 
Infuse DOD requirements into commercial electronics 
standards development processes 
Facilitate weapons systems interoperability for 
force capability multipliers 
Aid technology transfer to US industries for improved 
international competitiveness [Ref. 11] 
This step forward is a force-multiplier in the military 
acquisition process when combined with the following 
initiative. 
2.  Performance-based Standards 
Also adding to acquisition reform is the "Blueprint for 
Change." This is the plan to "decrease reliance, to the 
maximum extent practicable, on military specifications and 
standards." [Ref. 12]. "Specifications & Standards - A New 
Way of Doing Business," dated JUN 1994 was the title of The 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), William J.'Perry's Memorandum 
to top Government Officials. [Ref. 12] In this memorandum, 
the SECDEF stresses the need to make use of performance and 
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commercial specifications as the way of meeting the military 
needs of the future. Here is how Military Specifications and 
Standards are affected: 
Performance specifications shall be used when 
purchasing new systems, major modifications, 
upgrades to current systems, and Non-developmental 
and Commercial Items, for programs in any acquisition 
category.  If it is not practicable to use a 
performance specification, a non-Government standard 
shall be used.  Since there will be cases when 
military specifications are needed to define an 
exact design solution because there is no acceptable 
non-governmental standard or because the use of a 
performance specification or non-Governmental standard 
is not cost-effective, the use of military specifications 
and standards is authorized as a last resort, with 
an appropriate waiver. [Ref. 12] 
As I mentioned in the opening chapter, the time is right 
for change. The way I understand the SECDEFs memo, it makes 
the change quite clear: use military specifications only as a 
"last resort." Additionally, I feel that the ability to 
tailor programs also becomes easier. What I see in Mr. 
Perry's "intent," is for Government Officials to do business 
in a sound, efficient, and sensible (emphasis) manner. This 
is a license, in effect, to all Program Executive Officers 
(PEOs) and PMs to do the smart thing for their programs and 
challenge any rule, regulation, or law that doesn't make any 
sense when applied to their particular program. This is 
"free reign!" In my opinion, PMs should be feeling euphoria 
at the amount of freedom they are being given. However, right 
now there is tremendous skepticism on this new directive. 
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Many top military and civilian procurement officials feel that 
most of their military specifications are necessary. I agree 
with them, partially. For the most part, I feel that time 
will be the cure for the reluctance to let go of military 
specifications. Currently, they are a form of security. 
After all, this is a major change. But read the directive! 
If all else fails, then military specifications are authorized 
(with a waiver). It should be taken as an opportunity to have 
the best of both worlds. A possible drawback, on the other 
hand, according to the AEC PM, COL Oler, "is if the pendulum 
swings too far to the right." [Ref. 5] What he meant by that 
statement is that if military specifications are necessary, 
and the process for acquiring a waiver is extremely slow, then 
the acquisition process will be slowed as opposed to 
quickened. 
What I have outlined thus far in this chapter are some 
new innovative ideas and emerging RDT&E philosophies and 
technologies that I have found in my research for an improved 
ASE acquisition strategy. Additionally, I discussed two 
tools, Open Systems Architecture, and the use of performance 
and commercial specifications, that when combined with the new 
philosophies, present great potential for improving the 
acquisition process. Certainly, the information presented 
here is not a panacea for the cumbersome procurement process, 
but a starting block for more creativity to break away from 
the traditional, regulatory-entrenched, acquisition policies. 
In today's environment of continual process improvement, we 
must strive for perfecting and changing those processes that 
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no longer provide added value to the task or process at hand. 
I believe that the ideas presented in this chapter and the two 
tools that could help implement them, are only the first of 
many new creative and innovative improvements to the 
procurement process. The vision of a better acquisition 
process has been articulated. In the next few years, 
innovativeness should flourish and a new process shall be 
born. 
In the next chapter I will discuss possible mixes of 
emerging philosophies with certain economic lessons learned 
from Chapter III. By doing so, I will suggest how the current 
ASE procurement strategy can be improved. 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the previous acquisition strategy and economic 
analysis of the first production AN/APR-39A(V)1, the 
Government attained a higher degree of utility than expected 
by attaining cost and schedule goals at a realized savings of 
$406,528. The Government's price certainty for this product, 
however, is not clear because Dalmo Victor was justified as a 
sole-source provider. This purchase was noncompetitive 
because the processor of the RSDS was proprietary. During the 
ED phase, Dalmo Victor had developed the processor without 
Government funding. However, with the first production buy, 
the Government purchased the TDP which included unlimited 
rights and level-three (3) drawings. [Ref. 3] This was 
significant in that deliveries to field units were accelerated 
to make them available to soldiers serving in Operation Desert 
Shield/Storm. By not competing the first production buy, this 
schedule savings was realized. For future production buys, 
and because Defense resources are dwindling, the Government 
should allow competition to encourage effective cost 
management amongst providers, thereby obtaining added 
flexibility from its waning resources. 
The use of a 90% LR was applied to the pricing of the 
RSDS. However, the cost figures seemed to suggest less than 
a 90% LR. Through careful analysis, an ingenious use of price 
leveling and deferment of payment allowed the Government to 
realize a savings of nearly half a million dollars.  While 
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this amount may seem trivial, think of the added savings 
throughout the DOD if other programs could do the same thing. 
The savings should increase substantially. On the other hand, 
there is also the opposite to consider. Look at the savings 
that are not being taken advantage of with price and payment 
schemes such as this system achieved. 
This was a major lesson learned and such pricing 
strategies warrant more study and consideration in DOD 
acquisitions. 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The economic lessons learned from the AN/APR-39A(V)1 
acquisition and the emerging procurement philosophies and 
technologies show significant promise that can serve as a 
basis to develop an improved ASE procurement strategy. Large 
savings can be realized, for example, by combining the "Hover" 
philosophy and virtual prototyping. Before anything is built, 
computer modeling and simulation can create it in cyberspace. 
Many changes can be made to the design and then testing can be 
accomplished in a matter of hours. Think of the accumulated 
savings on materials, labor, and tooling, without even turning 
a wrench. Furthermore, this process enables the production 
design to become stabilized. This is significant because with 
a stable design, maximum benefit in cost estimation can be 
achieved by using a stable LR. Minimal, if any, ECPs would be 
required and the Government could gain leverage against 
contractors in estimating the contract cost. Other mixes and 
recommendations are described below. 
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While the above recommendation can have a significant 
impact in the design phase, its benefits also reach into the 
production phase. While in this phase, considerable efforts 
could be made in exploring designs that take advantage of open 
systems. In fact, I would recommend proprietary systems only 
as a last resort. Open systems architecture would reduce 
total life-cycle costs because international standards are 
less expensive than proprietary standards. Logistical 
concerns would also be reduced because more producers can 
compete to build spare parts without infringing on proprietary 
rights. Add to this approach performance-based 
specifications, and some time for contractors to realize this 
freedom, and the results should be impressive. I believe that 
within the next decade, defense industries will commit to 
establishing commercial standards that are not military 
specifications, but will suit military needs without the costs 
inherent in military specifications. 
From this analysis, I believe that an improved ASE 
acquisition strategy is possible if the ideas mentioned above 
are explored for their value added to the current strategy. 
While other possibilities were addressed in Chapter IV, they 
either do not promise as much potential as those mentioned 
here, or are already being used. Incorporating these new 
methods and a streamlined process promise to provide higher 
quality weapons and systems to the soldier than those 
delivered through the traditional methods. Additionally, the 
recommendations mentioned above would be moderately adaptable 
to changing threats.  This is possible because systems can 
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remain in the design phase longer (virtual prototyping and 
"hover"), and as open systems become the norm, changes to the 
design would not require a revamping of electrical interfaces. 
Revolutionary change to old procurement strategies and 
methods is now possible. The soldier in the field deserves 
the best equipment that the acquisition system can provide. 
It is essential that every effort be made to provide this 
service by exploiting the current opportunities. 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS EXCLUSIVE OF STRATEGY 
1. Along  with  the  move  to  performance-based 
specifications, insist on an open systems architecture. 
2. Should-Cost Analysis Teams and DCAA audits are an 
effective means to reduce questionable costs. 
3. Ensure that material and labor escalation costs are 
kept separate from the use of the LR. 
4. Consider new methods for incentivizing contractor 
performance by varying payment schemes. 
5. As limited defense funds grow increasingly unstable, 
consider purchasing data rights as an option. In the 
event that the program is canceled, less money is lost. 
6. Expect the unit quantities within deliveries to 
increase with time if a contractor promises learning. 
AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. The impact on the industrial base if "shelving 
technology" becomes a viable alternative to traditional 
procurement. 
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2. How long can a system "hover" without detriment or 
undue increased costs to the Government? 
3. The effect of TDPs as the procurement profession 
moves to open systems. Should data rights still be 
purchased? 
4. Cost estimating through the use of LRs. 
5. Pricing strategies that are mutually beneficial to 
both the Government and the contractor. 
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APPENDIX A.  AN/APR-39A(V)1 PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION 
GENERAL 
The AN/APR-3 9A(V)1 is an upgrade to the AN/APR-39(V)1. 
Warnings of radar directed systems are presented to the pilot 
via a digital processor, alphanumeric display, and synthetic 
voice. 
CHARACTERISTICS 
This system is compatible with the aircraft that use the 
AN/APR-39 (V) 1. Slight modifications to the existing aircraft 
wiring are necessary on some aircraft. Each of the ten 
components that make up the system (pictured below and on the 
following page) is independently replaceable. The system 
weight totals 15.5 lbs. This system is applicable to the 
following aircraft: AH-1F (COBRA), AH-64/D (APACHE), CH-47D 
and MH-47E (CHINOOK), UH-60Q (BLACKHAWK, MEDEVAC), MH-60K 
(BLACKHAWK, VARIANT) , AND OH-58C&D (KIOWA and KIOWA WARRIOR) . 
UNIT S RADAR RECEIVER 
R-2218/APR-39(V) 
(01-204-8266) 
UNIT 10 BLADE ANTENNA 
AS-2890/APR-39(V) 
(01-026-3927) 




UNIT 1  DETECTING SET CONTROL 
C-11308/APR-39A(V) 
(01-205-0658) 
UNIT 9 ANTENNA-DETECTOR 
AS-3548/APR-39(V) 
(01-204-8211) 
UNIT 2 RADAR SIGNAL INDICATOR 
IP-1150A/APR-39(V) 
(01-110-2230) 
UNIT 6 ANTENNA-DETECTOR 
AS-3549/APR-39(V) 
(01-204-8210) 










APPENDIX B.  COST DATA 
A.  ACTUAL COSTS 
(The following is a retype of an original memo [Ref. 7] 
for clarity purposes. It was also reduced to 10 pitch to fit 
the page.) 
SFAE-AV-AEC-B (HOOVER) 29 SEP 94 
AN/APR-39A(V)1 RADAR SIGNAL DETECTING SET(ALSO KNOWN AS RADAR WARNING 
RECEIVER) 
FIRST PRODUCTION CONTRACT DAB07-86-C-S031, DATED 24 SEP 86, WITH GENERAL 
INSTRUMENT CORPORATION (NOW KNOWN AS LITTON SYSTEMS INC., APPLIED TECHNOLOGY 
DIVISION, SAN JOSE, CA.) 
CONTRACT TYPE: FIRM-FIXED-PRICE, TWO MULTI-YEARS, WITH TWO MULTI-YEAR 
OPTIONS 
FIRST MULTI-YEAR AWARD-30 SEP 86-QTY 474-UNIT PRICE $37,022 - FY86 
SECOND MULTI-YEAR AWARD-19 DEC 86-QTY 587-UNIT PRICE $37,022 - FY87 
FIRST MULTI-YEAR OPTION AWARD-23 JAN 87-QTY 112-UNIT PRICE $34,663 -FY87 
FIRST MULTI-YEAR OPTION AWARD-16 JUN 88-QTY 765-UNIT PRICE $31,467 - FY88 
FIRST MULTI-YEAR OPTION AWARD-22 SEP 89-QTY 71-UNIT PRICE $37,441 - FY89 
SECOND MULTI-YEAR OPTION AWARD-18 SEP 90-QTY 1174-UNIT PRICE $32,186 - FY90 
SECOND MULTI-YEAR OPTION AWARD-30 NOV 90-QTY 121-UNIT PRICE $32,186 - FY91 
OPTION YEAR QTYS WERE DOUBLED THE FIRST AND SECOND MULTI-YEAR BUYS.  30 NOV 
9 0 OPTION AWARD WAS OBTAINED BY THE PM REQUESTING AN EXTENSION TO THE 
CONTRACT. 
THE CURRENT TOTAL SUM OF THIS CONTRACT IS $180,447,555.00.  THIS TOTAL 
INCLUDES THE COST OF SM-674A SIMULATORS, MX-9848A BENCH TEST SETS, NUMEROUS 
ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSALS, AND SOME FMS DOLLARS.  THIS CONTRACT REMAINS 
OPEN UNTIL JUNE 1997. 
THERE ARE TWO COMPONENTS THAT ARE FURNISHED AS GFE TO COMPLETE THIS SYSTEM. 
THE IP-1150A INDICATOR AND THE ANTENNA BLADE.  THESE COSTS ARE NOT INCLUDED 
IN THE ABOVE PRICES.  THE IP-1150A WAS PROCURED ON  SEPARATE CONTRACTS AND 
THE ANTENNA BLADE WAS REQUISITIONED THROUGH THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY. 
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B.  NEGOTIATED OPTION COSTS 
The following is a representation of option year costs 
under three alternatives.  Each alternative considers a 
different mix of future economic indicators as applied to 
labor and material escalations. [Ref. 3] 
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Present Value 
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("Comanche") 
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